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What is Sexual Orientation? 
 
 
Mary ZieglerI 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
At a time when the Supreme Court seems closer than ever before to treating 
sexual orientation as a suspect classification, consideration of the legal definition of 
sexual orientation is both timely and important. The Court’s 2015 decision in 
Obergefell recognizes two guideposts for defining sexual orientation: its 
immutability and normalcy. While other scholars offer rich and nuanced accounts 
of the fight for gay, lesbian, transgender, and bisexual rights, they do not fully 
analyze the history of sexual orientation as a legal category. This Article closes that 
gap, illuminating the hidden costs of the definition of sexual orientation that 
Obergefell endorses.  
In the past, definitions of sexual orientation based on immutability helped 
courts turn away equal protection arguments because of the “real” biological 
differences between same-sex and opposite sex couples. In the context of sexual 
orientation, arguments based on immutability admit the possibility that other “real” 
differences will undermine an otherwise promising equal protection claim, 
particularly with respect to reproduction. 
Immutability-based definitions also raise the possibility of discrimination on 
the basis of conduct. The conduct-status distinction has cropped up as courts weigh 
conscience-based objections to otherwise applicable civil rights protections for gays 
and lesbians. While conscience claims resting on the conduct-status distinction 
have failed so far, the history of sexual orientation as a legal category, together with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject, offers reason for concern. The 
Supreme Court has been less willing to equate conduct and status when 
discriminators invoke what the courts describe as a legitimate moral or religious 
objection to a particular act, like abortion. In describing homosexuality as an 
immutable sexual orientation rather than partly as a legitimate choice, the 
Obergefell Court assumes the validity of moral objections to both same-sex 
marriage and homosexuality. Immutability arguments do not address whether 
individuals’ choices deserve respect or tolerance, making it harder to argue against 
conscience-based objections. In the aftermath of the Court’s Obergefell decision, it 
will be just as important to promote a proper understanding of sexual orientation as 
it will to expand antidiscrimination protections. 
                                                                                                             
I Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College of Law. 
She would like to thank Al Brophy, Jessica Clarke, Courtney Cahill, Dov Fox, Deborah Dinner, Doug 
NeJaime, Jeff Redding, Anders Walker, and Rebecca Zietlow for agreeing to share thoughts on drafts of 
this piece. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At a time when the Supreme Court seems closer than ever before to treating 
sexual orientation as a suspect classification, consideration of the legal definition of 
sexual orientation is both timely and important.1 The Court’s 2015 decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges recognized two guideposts for defining sexual orientation: its 
immutability2 and normalcy.3 The Court thus seems poised to define sexuality in 
the terms long championed by the GLBTQ movement.4 However, sexual 
orientation as a legal category has a long and troubled history that is mostly missing 
from current scholarship. While other scholars offer rich and nuanced accounts of 
the fight for gay, lesbian, transgender, and bisexual rights, they offer an incomplete 
analysis of the history of sexual orientation as a legal category.5 This Article closes 
                                                                                                             
1 Obergefell did not directly address the question of sexual orientation discrimination, and the 
majority’s ruling relied as much on the definition of the fundamental right to marry as on the issue of 
sexual orientation discrimination. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Marriage Ruling Historic, 
but Not Final Word on Gay Rights, NAT. L.J., June 29, 2015, 2015  
LNSDUID-ALM-NTLAWJ-1202730710519 (available on LexisNexis). On the possibility that the 
courts will treat sexual orientation as a suspect classification, see, for example, Lydia DePillis, This Is the 
Next Front in the Battle for Gay Rights, WASH. POST, June 26, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/26/this-is-the-next-frontier-in-the-battle-
for-gay-rights/?utm_term=.8fc5700f9305 [https://perma.cc/876C-9B8F]; Timothy M. Phelps, Next 
Frontier for Gays Is Employment and Housing Discrimination, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2015, 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-gays-employment-20150626-story.html [https://perma.cc/T5F8-
TYHD]; David G. Savage & Timothy M. Phelps, Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Creates New 
Constitutional Liberty, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-supreme-
court-gay-marriage-decision-20150626-story.html [https://perma.cc/6U8W-8KV7]. 
2 An immutable characteristic has been defined as “a characteristic that either is beyond the power 
of the individual members of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences 
that it ought not be required to be changed.” In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985). 
3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (describing “sexual orientation [as] both a 
normal expression of human sexuality and immutable”). 
4 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he claim that sexual 
orientation is biologically determined has become increasingly salient in legal arguments that lesbians 
and gay men comprise a minority population warranting meaningful constitutional protection”); Susan 
R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1502–03 (2009) (arguing that 
“[c]onservative opponents of LGBT rights tend to argue that homosexuality is nothing more nor less 
than a series of behavioral choices[,]” while “[a]dvocates for LGBT rights have seized upon—and 
catalyzed—scientific research . . . to contend that homosexuality has a basis in biology or is otherwise 
determined by factors outside of individual control”); Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness 
Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 598 (2014) (stating 
that the “general ‘argument from etiology’ for LGB rights—what I call the ‘born that way’ and ‘not a 
choice’ arguments—are so popular that dissent from the idea that LGB people’s sexual orientations are 
innate and immutable is, in many contexts, treated as tantamount to opposing LGB rights”). 
5 For a sample of scholarship on the history of the movement for gay and lesbian rights, see, for 
example, MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE 
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 2012); JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL 
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that gap, illuminating the hidden costs of the definition of sexual orientation that 
Obergefell endorses. 
The rhetoric of sexual orientation first became prominent during the Cold War, 
when paranoia about Communist infiltration of the federal government led to a 
moral panic about homosexuals in the State Department.6 Cold warriors borrowed 
from an existing psychological dialogue about homosexuality, insisting that 
homosexuality was a mental illness.7 Lawmakers incorporated versions of this 
definition into the law of immigration and employment discrimination.8  
Founded in the 1950s, homophile organizations like the Mattachine Society 
and the Daughters of Bilitis (“DOB”) developed the concept of sexual orientation 
as an alternative to the view that homosexuality was a mental illness.9 Reasoning 
                                                                                                             
POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
1940–1970 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES]; VICKI L. 
EAKLOR, QUEER AMERICA: A GLBT HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY (2008); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008); 
LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE (2015); MARC 
STEIN, RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (2012) [hereinafter RETHINKING THE 
GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT]. Some scholars recognize that the term “sexual preference” once 
served as the preferred term among supporters of gay, lesbian, transgender, and queer rights but offer 
little explanation of either why this was the case or how sexual orientation as an alternative gained 
prominence. See, e.g., DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE 
STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 265 (1999); JOHN D’EMILIO, THE 
WORLD TURNED: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 156–57 (2002) [hereinafter 
THE WORLD TURNED: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE]; Angela M.L. 
Pattatucci & Dean H. Hamer, The Genetics of Sexual Orientation: From Fruit Flies to Humans, in 
SEXUAL NATURE SEXUAL CULTURE 155 (Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds., 1995); 
Clark A. Pomerleau, Consorting with the Enemy? Women’s Liberation Rhetoric About Sexuality, in 
SEXUAL RHETORICS: METHODS, IDENTITIES, PUBLICS 197 (Jonathan Alexander & Jacqueline 
Rhodes eds., 2016); EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND 
ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 41 (1999) [hereinafter MISMEASURE OF DESIRE]. These scholars 
touch on the fluidity of legal and political understandings of homosexuality in the twentieth century but 
do not focus on its evolution or larger stakes. This Article offers a comprehensive look at the history 
only briefly addressed in existing scholarship.  
6 On the Cold War anti-gay panic, see, e.g., ROBERT J. CORBER, HOMOSEXUALITY IN COLD 
WAR AMERICA: RESISTANCE AND THE CRISIS OF MASCULINITY (1997); George Chauncey, Jr., The 
Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160–78 (William Graebner 
ed., 1993); John D'Emilio, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, 
in PASSION AND POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 226–40 (Kathy Peiss  
& Christina Simmons eds. with Robert A. Padgug, 1989) [hereinafter The Homosexual Menace: The 
Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America]; DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE 
COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2004); 
CRAIG M. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN COLD WAR AMERICA (2012). 
7 See, e.g., K.A. CUORDILEONE, MANHOOD AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE COLD WAR 36 
(2005); CORBER, supra note 6, at 136; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 159–60 (describing stories of men 
who tried to “straighten [themselves] out” to rid themselves of their sexual tendencies). 
8 See CANADAY, supra note 5, at 56–58 (discussing the collaboration between immigration and 
military officials to identify gay persons).  
9 See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 7 (2012) 
(describing the formation of the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis); Comment on 
2017–2018                                 What is Sexual Orientation? 
 
65
from race, gay activists framed sexual orientation as inborn and involuntary.10 By 
contrast to race, however, activists also described sexual orientation as private and 
unrelated to personally-held moral views.11 In this way, in the short term, 
homophile activists could tackle discrimination against gays and lesbians without 
questioning the legitimacy of moral or religious opposition to homosexuality. 
Over time, however, courts and lawmakers developed their own definition of 
sexual orientation, and the legal definition advanced by homophile groups had the 
unintended consequence of justifying discrimination based on public identity or 
conduct rather than status.12  
Recognizing the risks associated with sexual orientation as a legal category, 
activists in the 1970s developed an alternative approach based on sexual or 
affectional preference.13 This category promised to protect those victimized because 
of public identity, conduct, stereotyping, or misperception.14 Additionally, by 
contrast to some definitions of sexual orientation, sexual preference as a category 
explicitly challenged the legitimacy of private, anti-gay bias.15 After the advent of 
the AIDS epidemic and the rise of the Religious Right and New Right, lawyers 
and activists would once again make sexual orientation the centerpiece of legal and 
political strategy.16 
The history of sexual orientation exposes the hidden costs of the victory 
achieved in Obergefell and the cases likely to follow it. Today, characterizing sexual 
identity as voluntary is a foundational element for arguments against the creation of 
strong civil rights laws for GLBTQ individuals. But contrary to what contemporary 
politics would suggest, the idea of an immutable sexual orientation has been used to 
limit equal treatment and justify intolerance on moral grounds.  
In particular, examining the history of sexual orientation gives cause for concern 
about any definition of sexual orientation, like Obergefell’s, based on immutability. 
Arguments from immutability carry familiar disadvantages associated with 
reasoning from race. For instance, with respect to sex discrimination, an analogy to 
race helped conservative courts turn away equal-protection arguments involving 
                                                                                                             
SEXOLOGY’s Symposium: The Causes of Homosexuality, MATTACHINE REV., July–Aug. 1955, at 
32 (discussing the opinions of an expert who believed homosexuality was an orientation “properly and  
deeply-implanted” in one’s nature); id. at 33 (“[H]omosexuals should not be considered as persons 
affected by a disease.”); Purpose of the Daughters of Bilitis, LADDER, Dec. 1964, at 1, 2. (stating that 
one of the purposes of the Daughters of Bilitis was educating “the public at large through acceptance 
first of the individual, leading to an eventual breakdown of erroneous taboos and prejudices”). 
10 See RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 597–98, 614–15.  
11 See infra, notes 99, 101 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra Part III.  
13 See infra Part II.  
14 See infra Part II.  
15 See infra Part II. 
16 See infra Part II. 
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reproduction because of the biological differences between men and women with 
respect to gestation.17  
Obergefell emphasizes that same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-
sex couples with respect to their ability to parent, carry on committed relationships, 
and appreciate the value of marriage as an institution.18 But arguments from 
immutability admit the possibility that other “real” differences will undermine an 
otherwise promising equal protection claim. In the context of cases involving 
parental rights, same-sex couples (although not same-sex individuals) arguably 
differ biologically in their ability to reproduce in vivo rather than turning to assisted 
reproduction. Laws regulating same-sex adoption, parenting, and access to assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) may be affected by the kind of “real” differences 
logic often associated with arguments from immutability.  
Arguments from immutability set an additional trap. To make progress under 
politically challenging circumstances, gay rights activists emphasized that sexual 
orientation was not only immutable but also expressed in private. This strategy 
opened the door to penalties based on conduct rather than status. In particular, the 
conduct-status distinction has cropped up as courts weigh conscience-based 
objections to otherwise applicable civil-rights protections for gays and lesbians. 
While these claims have not yet had much success, the history of sexual-orientation 
arguments, together with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject, offer 
reason for concern. 19 The Supreme Court has more often protected conduct-based 
discrimination when discriminators invoke what the courts view as a legitimate 
moral objection to a behavior.20 Obergefell assumes that moral and religious 
objections to same-sex marriage are defensible and even protected.21 As the Court’s 
opinion suggests, immutability arguments do not address whether individuals’ 
choices deserve respect, making it harder to argue against the kind of conscience-
based objection now championed by individuals and businesses opposed to same-
sex marriage. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the emergence of a sexual-
orientation based strategy to homosexuality, which arose in the 1950s and 1960s. 
At the height of the Cold War, politicians transformed psychological arguments 
that homosexuality was a mental illness. Reformist therapists pushed back, insisting 
that sexual orientation—defined as an unchanging propensity22—could not be 
altered by criminal penalties and that sodomy bans were both pointless and 
                                                                                                             
17 See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 63–68, 94–95, 217–18 (2011); see also Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the  
Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1792–93, 1796–97 (2008). 
18 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601–08 (2015). 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 Id. 
21 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
22 Homosexuality and Prostitution: B.M.A. Memorandum of Evidence for Departmental 
Committee, 2 Brit. Med. J. 165, 165 (Supp. 1955). 
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inhumane. Starting in the 1950s, homophile groups defined sexual orientation in a 
similar way, but their approach delivered mixed results.23  
Part I explains that in the 1950s and 1960s, courts and bureaucrats used the 
distinction between status and conduct to limit antidiscrimination protections. 
Assuming that sexual orientation, like race, was an immutable status, skeptical 
courts often rejected the claims of those who “flaunt[ed]” their sexual orientation.24 
Additionally, in early cases involving same-sex marriage, courts drew on the idea of 
real, biological differences developed in the context of race and sex. Because gay 
and lesbian couples were not similarly situated with respect to reproduction and 
biology, courts identified a rational basis for state restrictions on same-sex 
marriage.  
Part II explores the rise of the concept of sexual preference or choice as an 
alternative to sexual orientation. In early cases involving sexual orientation and 
privacy, judges used the distinction between orientation and conduct to justify 
employment discrimination against persons who publicly identified as gay or 
lesbian.25 As an alternative, activists in both national and state organizations 
defined a new legal category based on sexual or affectional preference.26 As Part II 
shows, enthusiasm for this legal approach waned in the face of the AIDS epidemic 
and the Religious Right and the New Right.27 Despite diminishing support for the 
concept of sexual preference, the reemergence of the concept of sexual orientation 
was neither inevitable nor a logical step in the growing tolerance of homosexuality. 
Part III studies the lead up to the Obergefell decision and the legal and political 
consequences of the different ideas of orientation following the decision. In 
particular, Part III focuses on the unintended costs of immutability arguments. Part 
IV briefly concludes. 
 
I.  THE INVENTION OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A LEGAL CATEGORY 
 
Prior to the 1950s, the rhetoric of sexual orientation did not refer to a status or 
apply disproportionately to homosexuality, but instead described sexually explicit 
materials or criticized individuals, gay or straight, who were particularly interested 
in sexual intercourse.28  
In the early 1950s, however, Cold War politics, new developments in sexology 
and psychology, and the emergence of homophile organizations changed the 
popular meaning of sexual orientation. Starting in 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy 
                                                                                                             
23 See infra Part I. 
24 See, e.g., Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 530 F.2d 247, 251–54 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 856–57 (D. Md. 1973). 
25 See Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 856–57.  
26 See infra notes 264, 269, 286, 289–90 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra Part II.   
28 For illustrations of this earlier, more general use of sexual orientation, see, for example, Albert 
Eide Parr, Sex Dimorphism and Schooling Behavior Among Fishes, 65 AM. NATURALIST 173, 176–80 
(1931); David Riesman, Psychological Types and National Character: An Informal Commentary, 5 
AM. Q. 325, 325–43 (1953).  
                                                       KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                     Vol. I06 68
(R-WI) and his allies in Congress targeted alleged gays and lesbians in the State 
Department.29 The Red Scare brought unprecedented political attention not only 
to the presence of homosexuals in the government but also to the definition of 
homosexuality.30 McCarthy and his colleagues helped to forge a discourse based on 
mental illness, weakness, vulnerability, and political progressivism.31 Because 
homosexuals were sick and morally weak, McCarthy argued that they were far 
more likely to endorse Communism or fall prey to blackmail schemes.32  
The conflation of Communism and homosexuality sparked debate about 
whether McCarthy’s vision of gays and lesbians rang true. For some time, 
sexologists and psychologists had debated whether people could choose not to be 
gay.33 Since the nineteenth century, researchers had discussed whether 
homosexuality was immutable, either the result of genetics, hormones, or a 
combination of the two.34 The Red Scare transformed this dialogue into a political 
and legal battle. In Britain and the United States, with the politicization of debate, 
psychologists took fresh interest in the subject of sexuality, publishing new studies 
distinguishing sexual behavior from what therapists called sexual orientation.35 
While psychologists maintained that gays or lesbians could refrain from 
homosexual behavior, the new studies affirmed that sexual orientation—a person’s 
ingrained preference or propensity—would not change after therapy.36 
This Part traces the development of sexual orientation as a legal category. First, 
this Part explores the political debate about the origins and nature of homosexuality 
that emerged during the Cold War, as McCarthy and his allies transformed 
arguments that same-sex sexuality signaled mental illness. Next, this Part traces the 
development of sexual orientation arguments in the homophile movement. Finally, 
the Part illuminates how some courts used the idea of sexual orientation to limit 
demands for equal treatment made by gays and lesbians. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
29 See infra pp. 7–9. 
30 See infra pp. 7–9. 
31 See infra pp. 7–9. 
32 See infra pp. 7–9. 
33 See infra p. 7. 
34 For a summary of the state of the pre-1970s debate among psychiatrists and psychologists about 
the nature of homosexuality, see Albert Ellis, Constitutional Factors in Homosexuality: A Re-
Examination of the Evidence, 1 ADVANCES IN SEX RESEARCH 161, 161–79, 182 (1963).  
35 See, e.g., Desmond Curran & Denis Parr, Homosexuality: An Analysis of 100 Male Cases Seen 
in Private Practice, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 797, 797–801 (1957) (studying a group of patients that had 
demonstrated homosexual tendencies to better define the characteristics of homosexuals); 
Homosexuality and Prostitution: B.M.A. Memorandum of Evidence for Departmental Committee, 2 
Brit. Med. J. 165, 165–70 (Supp. 1955) (discussing the “causes and nature of homosexuality and 
prostitution”); Treatment of Homosexuality, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1347, 1347 (1958) (assessing medical 
interventions for treating homosexuality).    
36 See Homosexuality and Prostitution: B.M.A. Memorandum of Evidence for Departmental 
Committee, supra note 35, at S165–69.  
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A.  Cold War Politics Redefine Homosexuality 
 The definition of homosexuality had long been a subject of fascination for 
psychologists and sexologists. Sexologists including Richard von  
Krafft-Ebing (1886),37 and Albert Havelock Ellis (1897)38 argued that 
homosexuality was an inborn, genetic condition.39 Others maintained that 
homosexuality resulted from a hormonal imbalance.40 Another line of disagreement 
touched on whether effective treatment could eliminate homosexuality.41  
In 1950, when Senator McCarthy went public with arguments about a 
connection between homosexuality and Communism, political interest in the 
nature of sexuality intensified considerably.42 In speaking to the media, McCarthy 
told a story about a “flagrant homosexual” who had worked at the State 
Department and won reinstatement, notwithstanding concern that the employee 
would be a security risk.43 McCarthy suggested that closeted homosexuals posed a 
particularly pernicious threat to the nation because of the potential for blackmail.44 
Given that sodomy was against the law,45 McCarthy insinuated that gays and 
lesbians would sacrifice the nation’s security rather than risk public exposure.46 
Republicans soon realized that the supposed threat of homosexuality was a 
powerful political weapon. With Democrat Harry Truman in the White House, 
McCarthy and his allies suggested that neither the administration nor the 
Democratic Party could protect the nation.47 If the Democratic Party was unwilling 
or unable to keep “sexual perverts” out of important, sensitive national positions, 
how could Truman meaningfully fight the Cold War?48  
In 1950, Guy George Gabrielson, the chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, played up what he called “the homosexual angle,” arguing that the 
“sexual perverts who have infiltrated our government” were as “dangerous as the 
                                                                                                             
37 See RICHARD VON KRAFFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO CONTRARY SEXUAL INSTINCT: A MEDICO FORENSIC STUDY (Charles Gilbert Chaddock, trans., 
F.A. Davis Co. 1892) (1886). 
38 See HAVELOCK ELLIS & JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS, SEXUAL INVERSION (1897). 
39 See Ellis, supra note 34, at 161 (summarizing studies of Krafft-Ebing and Albert Havelock Ellis).  
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 175–80 (offering an overview of scholarly field). 
42 On preoccupation with homosexuality during the Cold War, see, for example, D’EMILIO  
& FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 294–97; The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold 
War America, supra note 6, at 226–32. 
43 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 26–27; William S. White, McCarthy Says Miss Kenyon 
Helped 28 Red Front Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1950, at 1; see also CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 6; 
BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY 390–91 (2000).  
44 See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 167 
(1990); JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 24; HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A 
HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 244 (2014). 
45 CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 1–6. 
46 See, e.g., The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, supra note 
6, at 227–28, 230.  
47 Id. at 227.  
48 See id. 
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Communists [themselves].”49 A Senate committee investigating the issue in 1950 
concluded that thousands of homosexuals worked in the federal government and 
put Americans at risk.50  
The Senate investigation produced a new analysis on the connection between 
homosexuality and Communism. McCarthy and his allies had previously played up 
the risk of blackmail.51 Prominent senators argued that gays and lesbians were also 
especially likely to be Communists because homosexuality was a profound mental 
disturbance.52 Senator Clyde Hoey (D-NC) explained to the New York Times, 
“The lack of emotional stability which is found in most sex perverts, and the 
weakness of their moral fiber, makes them susceptible to the blandishments of 
foreign espionage agents.”53 McCarthy had argued that Communism itself resulted 
from mental illness.54 By connecting homosexuality to the Red Scare, some 
Senators, especially Republicans, crafted a new image of gays and lesbians as 
mentally unbalanced, selfish, and vulnerable to the influence of foreign foes. 
This new understanding of homosexuality soon justified a dramatic expansion 
of efforts to legally surveil and punish gays and lesbians.55 Shortly after his 1953 
inauguration, President Dwight Eisenhower signed into law an executive order 
making homosexuality sufficient grounds for dismissal from federal employment.56 
New applicants for federal jobs faced a rigorous screening process that kept many 
gays and lesbians out of federal jobs.57 Many state and local governments largely 
copied the federal approach, as did private industries.58 The Armed Services also 
stepped up its efforts to police homosexuality, developing a more elaborate policy 
concerning when and why gays and lesbians posed a threat to the morale and 
security of the nation’s troops.59 
The crackdown on gays and lesbians spawned new legal definitions of 
homosexuality. One such definition took shape between 1950 to 1952, when 
                                                                                                             
49 Perverts Called Government Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1950, at 25.  
50 See, e.g., William S. White, Inquiry by Senate on Perverts Asked, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1950, at 
8 [hereinafter Inquiry by Senate on Perverts Asked]. The press would regularly report on the total 
number of State Department employees dismissed as being “sexual perverts.” See, e.g., 384 Ousters 
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51 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
52 See, e.g., Federal Vigilance on Perverts Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1950, at 3; Inquiry by 
Senate on Perverts Asked, supra note 50. 
53 Federal Vigilance on Perverts Asked, supra note 52, at 3. 
54 See JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 16. 
55 See, e.g., CHAUNCEY, supra note 6, at 160–78; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 63; 
The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, supra note 6, at 226–40. 
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08 (2005); PHIL TIEMEYER, PLANE QUEER: LABOR, SEXUALITY, AND AIDS IN THE HISTORY OF 
MALE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS 62–63 (2013). 
57 The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, supra note 6, at 229. 
58 Id.  
59 The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, supra note 6, at 229; 
see generally CANADAY, supra note 5, at 180–205. 
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Senator Patrick McCarran (D-NV) spearheaded an overhaul of the nation’s 
immigration law.60 McCarran promised a unifying approach to immigration based 
on “color-blind” citizenship and shared values.61 While the 1952 McCarran-Walter 
Act preserved “the national origins quota system” that favored immigrants from 
Northern and Western Europe,62 the law assumed that all Americans citizens 
shared an aversion to sexual deviance.63 In addition to carrying forward the policy 
of excluding aliens on the basis of “crime of moral turpitude,” the drafters of the act 
wanted to exclude persons afflicted with “psychopathic personalities,” or persons 
who were “homosexuals or sex pervert[s].”64 After the Public Health Commission 
reassured members of Congress that the language of “psychopathic personality” was 
broad enough to encompass homosexuality, the final version of the McCarran-
Walter Act only implicitly addressed sexual behavior.65 
After 1944, the military also developed new tools to identify, discharge, and 
discipline homosexual personnel.66 Previously, servicemen and women could face 
dishonorable discharge for violent or consensual homosexual acts.67 Starting in the 
1950s, the military also investigated and censured service members for “homosexual 
‘tendencies,’” a strategy that allowed officers to target those only suspected of being 
gay or lesbian.68 
 
B.  Homophile Groups Use Scientific Uncertainty as an Argument Against 
Discrimination 
 
As Margot Canaday has shown, the law helped to shape the public 
understanding of homosexuality, defining it not only as a statutory category but 
also as an identity citizens adopted, resisted, and helped to shape.69 However, 
starting in the 1950s, medical professionals and homophile activists resisted the 
definition of homosexuality emerging in immigration and military law.70 Groups 
advocating for the rights of gays and lesbians organized earlier in the decade in 
                                                                                                             
60 See, e.g., CANADAY, supra note 5, at 215–21l; ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN 
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61 CANADAY, supra note 5, at 216–17. 
62 Id. at 217. 
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69 See generally CANADAY, supra note 5. 
70 See infra pp. 13–16.  
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response to the federal and state repression of homosexuality.71 One of the first 
organizations, the Mattachine Society, took inspiration from the publicity 
surrounding Alfred Kinsey’s controversial work on sexuality.72 In 1948, Kinsey, a 
zoologist at Indiana University, and his colleagues published Sexual Behavior in the 
Human Male.73 Kinsey reported that 46% of male subjects had reacted sexually to 
persons of the same sex, and nearly 40% had had at least one homosexual 
experience.74  
Encouraged by the Kinsey Report, Harry Hay, a former Communist and labor 
activist, proposed that gay men organize to demand better treatment.75 By 
December 1950, Hay led the first meeting of the Mattachine Society in 
California.76 Over the course of the next decade, chapters of the Mattachine 
Society formed in several major metropolitan areas, and the organization replaced 
any connection to Communism with a focus on civil rights.77 In 1952, a group of 
Mattachine members formed ONE, Inc., another gay rights group, and three years 
later, a lesbian couple, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyons, helped to form the first 
lesbian rights organization, the Daughters of Bilitis (DOB).78    
Early homophile organizations primarily provided a social outlet for individuals 
who could face criminal sanctions for publicly expressing themselves.79 However, 
ONE, Mattachine, and DOB soon started working toward an alternative definition 
of homosexuality, one that would challenge the anti-gay assumptions increasingly 
being written into law.80 From the start, homophile publications experimented with 
                                                                                                             
71 On the rise of the homophile movement, see, for example, FADERMAN, supra note 5, at 53–90; 
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CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 75 (2002); LOFTIN, supra note 6, at 7, 19–20,  
39–69; C. TODD WHITE, PRE-GAY L.A.: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR 
HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS 39–43, 89–113 (2009).  
79 See, e.g., EAKLOR, supra note 5, at 95–99; MARCIA M. GALLO, DIFFERENT DAUGHTERS: A 
HISTORY OF THE DAUGHTERS OF BILITIS AND THE RISE OF THE LESBIAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT  
29–32 (2006) (illustrating the Daughters use of a newsletter to provide “civil liberties education” and 
other advice on homosexuality to their followers); SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES, supra 
note 5, at 108–13, 203–04 (discussing each homophile organization’s publications and their efforts to 
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80 See, e.g., FADERMAN, supra note 5, at 63–66 (discussing Mattachine’s efforts to support a 
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alternative definitions of homosexuality. In 1955, for example, the Mattachine 
Review published a piece asking, “Why not regard homosexuality as merely a 
difference in the direction of the sexual instinct?”81 In the mid-1950s, DOB’s 
magazine, The Ladder, proposed a similar understanding of lesbianism.82 DOB 
Leader, Del Martin, argued, “The Lesbian is a woman endowed with all the 
attributes of any other woman,” the “only difference lies in her choice of a love 
partner.”83 
In the mid-1950s, led by ONE, homophile groups publicized research on the 
causes and treatment of homosexuality.84 Given the scientific uncertainty 
surrounding homosexuality, ONE and its allies argued that lawmakers should not 
seek to define a term even the experts failed to understand.85 “Because we will 
grapple with such controversial question as: causes, cure[s], social adjustments, 
personal behavior, ethical standards, [and] prejudices,” ONE explained, “it is not to 
be expected that pat and immediate answers will be easily achieved, if at all.”86  
The Mattachine Society similarly relied on this tactic to push back against the 
persecution of gay men. Consider the strategy Mattachine used in responding to a 
scandal in Boise, Idaho. In the mid-1950s, a private investigator hired to look into 
gay sex in the town claimed to have exposed a “homosexual underground” 
operating in the city.87 The Boise investigation led to over 1400 interviews and a 
handful of arrests, convictions, and sentences of life imprisonment.88 
To defuse intense public anger, the leaders of the Mattachine Society argued 
that scientific experts, not lawmakers, should define homosexuality.89 Without 
understanding homosexuality, lawmakers could not hope to effectively regulate it.90 
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82 See Del Martin, The Positive Approach, LADDER, Nov. 1956, at 8, 8. 
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84 On the emphasis put on research, see, for example, GALLO, supra note 79, at 104; HENRY L. 
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88 D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 294; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 97–98; SEXUAL 
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Writing on the Boise scandal, Ken Burns, a Mattachine leader, argued, “We have 
to get at the root of this social problem before we can solve it judiciously . . . .”91  
Later in the decade, the Mattachine Society argued that lawmakers should not 
criminalize homosexual sex until scientists could understand or treat it. For 
example, Burns explained in 1956, “The solution of the problems of persons yet to 
be born who will become homosexual—who are maybe even destined to be 
homosexual—lies in preventative means.”92 Scientific uncertainty became a key 
argument against the criminalization of sexual conduct. Burns suggested that 
punishing gays and lesbians was fruitless until scientists knew what defined 
homosexuality.93 Burns explained, “The Mattachine Society is prepared to sit down 
with legislators, law enforcement officers, judges and others in the legal field to 
work out an objective program to meet the legal problems affecting homosexuality 
and to constructively administer to the causes and not the symptoms of the 
problem.94  
As importantly, a focus on research lent credibility to homophile groups whose 
very existence many questioned. In 1956, to advance this effort, ONE created the 
ONE Institute, an entity committed to research on homosexuality.95 In the mid-to-
late 1950s, participants at the institute entertained a variety of opinions about the 
causes of homosexuality.96 While the appearance of objectivity was vital, research 
had a clear political aim. As one institute attendee explained, “[W]e must show the 
public that homosexuality is not a contagious disease or a great threat to the body 
politic as it is so often feared or purported to be . . . .”97 
 
C.  Sexual Orientation Becomes Part of an Argument for Equal Treatment 
 
Starting in the late 1950s, DOB and Mattachine began promoting their own 
definitions of sexual orientation.98 At the time, homophile groups celebrated the 
recommendation by blue ribbon commissions in the United States and Britain that 
homosexuality should be decriminalized.99 In 1962, the American Law Institute 
(ALI) recommended that private acts of sodomy no longer be governed by criminal 
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law.100 But a different rhetoric of sexual orientation first emerged from a related 
dialogue about law reform in 1954 in the United Kingdom, when a government-
sponsored committee of fifteen, known as the Wolfenden Committee, considered 
whether prostitution and homosexuality should still be criminalized.101 The 
committee asked the British Medical Association (BMA) to provide an evidence 
report on the science of homosexuality.102 In 1955, the BMA reported, 
“Homosexuality is popularly understood to mean the commission of homosexual 
practices. This is not so . . . . Most people, if not all, possess in different degrees 
both homosexual and heterosexual potentialities.”103  
The BMA used the term “sexual orientation” to describe the limits of 
treatment.104 To be sure, the BMA endorsed any effective measure to reduce the 
prevalence of homosexuality.105 “The real safeguard against homosexual activity is 
public opinion,” the BMA reasoned, “and measures to promote a healthy attitude 
toward[] sex should be promoted and supported by all possible means.”106 
Nevertheless, the BMA asserted that sexual orientation—an individual’s inborn 
propensity—could not be changed.107 “[The medical profession] is in a position to 
do valuable work in enabling the individual to overcome his disability, even if it 
cannot alter his sexual orientation,” the BMA explained.108 Before and after the 
committee issued its final report, the BMA frequently used sexual orientation as 
shorthand to distinguish an individual’s conduct from her identity or feelings of 
attraction.109  
After the release of the Wolfenden Report in 1957, homophile groups 
immediately identified the use of the term sexual orientation as a promising 
rhetorical strategy.110 The BMA had legitimized arguments that sexual orientation, 
however defined, did not change as a result of treatment. This finding fit well with 
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the conclusion, often stressed at homophile gatherings, that law enforcement could 
not legitimately target someone for being gay or lesbian because that person could 
not be blamed for her own sexual attractions.111 Confirming that gays and lesbians 
should not be punished for something they could not control, sympathetic 
attorneys reminded homophile activists that the law criminalized sodomy, not 
homosexual status.112 
Splitting off conduct from status helped gays and lesbians win limited support 
from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In the 1950s, the ACLU 
refused to take a stand against regulations of consensual sex.113 Instead, the group 
insisted that homosexuals were unfairly denied due process and disproportionately 
punished for violating sodomy laws that applied to everyone else.114 Targeting 
unequal treatment allowed both the ACLU and homophile groups to expand legal 
protections without challenging the legitimacy of morals regulations. At the same 
time, homophile groups distinguished public conduct, including solicitation and 
indecency, from private behavior that should not offend anyone.115 This move 
proved especially valuable to activists trying to distance themselves from the 
negative stereotypes surrounding “flagrant” homosexuality.116 
The idea of an unchangeable orientation seemed to be a potent argument 
against the selective application of the law to gays and lesbians. In the late 1950s, 
for example, DOB emphasized the idea of an unchangeable status in lobbying for 
the repeal of California’s criminal vagrancy statute.117 First introduced in the 
                                                                                                             
111 See, e.g., Mattachine Breaks Through the Conspiracy of Silence, LADDER, Oct. 1959, at 5, 5–7 
(urging a reevaluation of the treatment of homosexuals in light of the fact that they cannot change their 
orientation); Mattachine Conference, LADDER, Nov. 1962, at 4, 4–7 (discussing abuses in the 
application of sex crime laws). 
112 See Mattachine Conference, supra note 111, at 4–7 (providing ACLU lawyer’s commentary on 
the disparate application of sexual crime statutes against homosexual persons); see also SEXUAL 
POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES, supra note 5, at 144–46 (discussing lawyers’ favorable views toward 
repealing sodomy laws).  
113 See, e.g., Mattachine Breaks Through the Conspiracy of Silence, supra note 111, at 7 (discussing 
the ACLU taking “no position on states having the right to pass laws on sex actions”); Mattachine 
Conference, supra note 111, at 5, 9 (discussing the ACLU’s position on legislators regulating sex and its 
impact on homosexuals); The ACLU Takes a Stand on Homosexuality, LADDER, Mar. 1957, at 8, 8.  
114 See, e.g., Mattachine Breaks Through the Conspiracy of Silence, supra note 111, at 7 (discussing 
the ACLU’s desire that pro-homosexual groups receive “just treatment”); Mattachine Conference, supra 
note 111, at 4–5 (“Sexual crime[] [statutes] . . . apply to both heterosexual and homosexual alike, but in 
practice are more often applied to the homosexual.”); The ACLU Takes a Stand on Homosexuality, 
supra note 113, at 9 (discussing “registration laws” and the “social validity of laws aimed at suppression . 
. . of homosexuals”).  
115 See Quotable Quote, MATTACHINE REV., Sept.–Oct. 1955, at 2, 2 (arguing that “legal 
prohibitions against [private] adult homosexual behavior” should be eliminated “altogether”); 
Mattachine Convention: The Diagnosis Is Hopeful, LADDER, Sep. 1958, at 24–25 (providing examples 
of homophile activists’ endorsement of bans on non-consensual and violent sexual conduct).   
116 This Part later addresses concerns about individuals being targeted because of inaccurate 
stereotypes based on the conduct of a small group of actors. 
117 See Del Martin, Open Letter to Assemblyman John A. O’Connell, LADDER, Sept. 1958, at 5, 
5–7 [hereinafter Open Letter to Assemblyman John A. O’Connell] (urging the California legislature to 
2017–2018                                 What is Sexual Orientation? 
 
77
nineteenth century, the law often applied to those suspected of having a propensity 
to commit victimless sex crimes, including prostitutes and gay men.118 In arguing 
against the law, DOB borrowed from and refined the idea of sexual orientation 
that had come to the fore during debate about the Wolfenden Report: 
 
Experts in the field [generally concede] that the cause of homosexuality is still an 
unknown quantity, that it is a process of development and not a matter of choice, 
that the incidence cannot be controlled by legislation, that the fear and insecurity 
imposed upon the homosexual by prejudiced and outmoded laws hamper the 
therapist in his efforts to help the individual make his adjustment to himself and 
society, and finally that [the laws] benefit no one but the blackmailers.119 
 
For DOB, the language of sexual orientation reinforced that criminal laws 
could never do any good. Even if legislators viewed homosexuality as harmful, no 
criminal law or therapy could change a status that was “not a matter of choice.”120 
Nor, if status was immutable, could legislation meaningfully reduce the frequency 
of sodomy. Without challenging the legitimacy of morals laws, DOB argued that 
they were too ineffective to support.121 
An intersecting debate about pornography, censorship, and obscenity reinforced 
interest in arguments involving sexual orientation.122 Since the introduction of the 
Comstock Act in 1873, federal law had prohibited the mailing of “obscene” 
materials, created a new federal position to monitor the mail, and treated violations 
as a felony.123 After World War II, the spread of pornography brought on new 
concern about the effect of sexually explicit material.124 Soldiers’ consumption of 
                                                                                                             
consider the homosexual minority and society’s grave misunderstandings about the causes of 
homosexuality in overturning California’s vagrancy laws).  
118 See Open Letter to Assemblyman John A. O’Connell, supra note 117, at 5; see also JOSH SIDES, 
EROTIC CITY: SEXUAL REVOLUTIONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN SAN FRANCISCO 127 (2009) 
(discussing California statutes attacking vagrancy and loitering “in or about public toilets in public 
parks”).  
119 Open Letter to Assemblyman John A. O’Connell, supra note 117, at 5–6.  
120 Id. at 6. 
121 Id. 
122 NICOLA KAY BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY 
REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 76–103 (1997). 
123 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1462 (2012); see, e.g., Beisel, supra note 123 at 76–78, 80, 86–95 
(outlining Comstock’s efforts to control the circulation of “obscene literature” and attempts to censor 
and control discussion of sexuality); ANDREA TONE, DEVICES & DESIRES: A HISTORY OF 
CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA 4–24 (2002) (discussing the passage of the Comstock Act and the 
history of Congress criminalizing obscenity); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, AGAINST OBSCENITY: 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA, at 1873–1935, at 3–5, 9–12 (2004) 
(discussing Comstock’s urging for the adoption of a “federal anti-obscenity law” that “forbade using the 
postal system to distribute obscene materials”). 
124 See, e.g., JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 397–400 (2003) (discussing the rising concern about pornography after the Second World 
War); WHITNEY STRUB, PERVERSION FOR PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY AND THE 
RISE OF THE NEW RIGHT 86–90 (2011) (discussing post-World War II First Amendment protection 
of sexual foreign films and the growing television market). 
                                                       KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL                                     Vol. I06 78
pornography worried legislators, as did the spread of comic books.125 In 1955, 
psychiatrist Frederic Wertham published Seduction of the Innocent, indicting 
comic books for corrupting the sexual morals of the nation’s youth.126 Wertham 
expressed particular concern about the possibility that “normal” children exposed to 
comics would become homosexual, and he maintained that Batman, the popular 
superhero, was “psychologically homosexual.”127  
Fears about the effect of pornography soon gave rise to political action. In 1954, 
parent-teacher associations in several states, demanded laws outlawing sex, 
violence, and crime in the comic books read by teenagers.128 The same year, a 
congressional subcommittee on juvenile delinquency led by Senator Estes Kefauver 
(D-TN) pursued the theory that pornographic materials changed the sexual 
behavior of American youth.129 As one of Kefauver’s allies in Congress testified, 
pornography had been tied to “related problems such as juvenile delinquency, the 
rise in crime rate, teenage discontent and rebellion, and even certain trends in the 
field of mental illness.”130 The same year, the solicitor for the Postmaster General 
argued that sexually explicit materials would convert “juveniles, and persons who 
have not the intelligence, nor the background, to withstand it.”131 
Homophile groups used the idea of sexual orientation to defuse the danger of 
censorship of their own publications. In 1957, when the Los Angeles Postmaster 
refused to mail a copy of ONE Magazine, GLBTQ movement attorneys argued 
that it was not obscene under the Comstock Act or related federal regulations.132 In 
an extremely brief per curium opinion, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court 
decision holding ONE to be obscene,133 but for movement members, the issue of 
pornography reached beyond the issue of censorship. Central to the Kefauver 
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hearings was an assumption that sexual identity changed if an individual was 
exposed to the wrong magazine.134   
Groups like the Mattachine Society seized on the idea of sexual orientation to 
explain that tolerance of gays and lesbians would not increase the odds that other 
Americans, particularly juveniles, would become homosexual. As Curtis Dewees 
explained in the Mattachine Review in 1958, “Most of my readers will realize that . 
. . one’s personality orientation is not changed by the mere reading of books.”135 A 
year later, William Reynard, of the ACLU, criticized legislators for refusing to 
recognize their “inability to change the orientation of [homosexuals].”136  
 
D.  The Mattachine Society of Washington Promotes Sexual Orientation as a 
Legal Category 
 
The rhetoric of sexual orientation took on new importance after 1961, when 
Frank Kameny, a former astronomer dismissed from his federal position, founded a 
more militant chapter of Mattachine in Washington, DC.137 While earlier leaders 
and other Mattachine chapters had mostly used scientific uncertainty as an 
argument against the aggressive persecution of gays, Kameny’s Mattachine Society 
of Washington (MSW) publicized a legal definition of sexual orientation designed 
to help gays and lesbians take on the federal government. “Our movement, whether 
we like it to be so or not, is primarily one of a political, public-relations, and social-
action nature, and only to a limited degree, a scientific one,” Kameny explained.138 
“For these reasons of fact, of logic, and of strategy and tactics, I, personally, take 
the position that . . . homosexuality, per se, is neither a sickness, a defect, a 
disturbance, nor a malfunction of any sort.”139 
MSW leaders argued that gays and lesbians, not psychologists or bureaucrats, 
had the most expertise about homosexuality.140 Even so, MSW leaders defined 
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sexual orientation primarily as a legal alternative to the definitions emerging in 
medicine, politics, and immigration and employment law.141 MSW explained its 
agenda in the following terms: 
 
The Society maintains that, in the absence of valid evidence to the 
contrary, homosexuality is not a sickness, but is an orientation not 
different in kind from heterosexuality. It aims primarily to combat 
prejudice and discrimination by seeking acceptance of the homosexual as 
a homosexual, not by “rehabilitating” him or converting him to 
heterosexuality.142 
 
In MSW’s analysis, the idea of sexual orientation served as an alternative to 
both of the major legal attacks on homosexuality. First, by describing 
homosexuality as an orientation, MSW rejected its categorization as a mental 
illness, instead defining homosexuality and heterosexuality as equally natural, 
healthy, and normal. Second, by rejecting the idea that homosexuality was a matter 
of changeable behavior or preference, MSW built a more compelling case for 
ending anti-gay discrimination and dispelled rumors that openly gay men could 
convert others to homosexuality. The rhetoric of sexual orientation signaled that 
homosexuality was both immutable and largely unrelated to an individual’s 
adjustment or societal contributions.  
The idea of sexual orientation also figured centrally in what one homophile 
magazine called “the need for salesmanship.”143 In the early 1960s, sympathetic 
media outlets provided more coverage of issues related to homosexuality.144 To 
benefit from this new media attention, groups like DOB and Mattachine hoped to 
develop a message that would resonate with those who did not yet hold a strong 
opinion about homosexuality. One strategy that emerged from Mattachine’s 
national convention in the early 1960s urged activists to emphasize the following 
issues: 
 
That the homosexual . . . is willing to look upon society with good  
will . . . that there are many types of homosexuals and many different 
                                                                                                             
Lesbians and Gays and the Politics of Knowledge: Rethinking General Models of Mass Opinion 
Change, in SEXUAL IDENTITIES, QUEER POLITICS 348 (Mark Blasius ed., 2001) (detailing Frank 
Kameny’s insistence that gay activists had more authority to “speak on the question of homosexuality” 
than scientific experts).  
141 See Our President Speaks, supra note 139, at 4, 8 (urging members of the Mattachine Society to 
take a bold position on the definition of homosexuality rather than a “carefully weighed,  
overly-cautious, scientific[ally] neutral[]” position). 
142 THE MATTACHINE SOC’Y OF WASH., https://rainbowhistory.omeka.net/items/show/4937956 
(follow “Files” hyperlink) [http://perma.cc/G5N8-P2RH] (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).  
143 See John LeRoy, The New Publicity Break: Where Do We Go from Here?, LADDER, Nov. 
1962, at 16, 17. 
144 See SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES, supra note 5, at 217–18 (“As homophile 
activists left behind the isolation of the 1950s, they discovered the press responded accordingly. 
Movement initiatives assumed a newsworthy quality.”). 
2017–2018                                 What is Sexual Orientation? 
 
81
attitudes about them; that homosexuality is not a remote contagious 
disease, but a combination of hereditary and environmental 
conditions.145 
 
Significantly, Kameny and MSW made sexual orientation an important part of 
an analogy MSW drew between race and sexuality.146 Homophile activists began 
reasoning from race almost from the outset. In 1955, the Mattachine Review 
highlighted research suggesting “that homosexuality is caused by a physiological 
predisposition”; “If this is so,” the Mattachine Review argued, “a homosexual is no 
more responsible for his [homosexuality] than are people responsible for the color 
of their skins”.147  
By the early 1960s, when the civil rights movement was consistently making 
headlines, the benefits of reasoning from race seemed clear. As The Ladder 
explained in 1963, “The U.S. is being compelled to listen to and grant rights to all 
minority groups.”148 DOB made the case that gays and lesbians counted as a 
minority, both politically and constitutionally, stating: “[A] minority is a group 
who are considered . . . to have a trait in common.”149 The DOB further explained 
that, “[T]he individual himself is blamed and punished for attributes that rightly or 
wrongly are placed on the entire group, and the group as a whole is blamed or 
punished for the transgressions of individuals.”150 Ultimately, in DOB’s analysis, 
the threat of stereotyping faced both racial and sexual minorities. 
MSW elaborated on DOB’s experimentation with analogies between 
homosexuality and race. In a 1962 letter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 
Kameny explained, “We feel that for the 15,000,000 American homosexuals, we 
are in much the same position as the NAACP is in for the Negro, except for the 
minor difference that . . . we are fighting official prejudice and discriminatory 
policy and practice . . . at the [f]ederal level.”151 In support of this argument, 
Kameny defined the homosexual as “one whose direction of choice of a sexual 
partner differs from that of the majority of the citizenry in what he is attracted to 
and chooses partners of his or her own sex.”152 While gays and lesbians may have 
control over their conduct or partners, Kameny clarified that no one had control 
over his orientation. He stated, “Homosexuality is neither a . . . disease . . . nor 
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other disturbance, but merely a matter of the predisposition of a significantly large 
minority of our citizens.”153  
Later in the 1960s, as MSW became increasingly prominent, the organization 
continued emphasizing arguments involving sexual orientation. Writing under the 
pseudonym Warren Adkins, MSW leader, Jack Nichols,154 maintained that 
“homosexuality per se is not a sickness, but is an orientation not different in kind 
from heterosexuality.”155 Nichols reminded readers of the importance of convincing 
Americans that homosexuality was nothing more than a sexual orientation: 
“[S]ickness equals inferior status . . . . It is on the issure [sic] of homosexuality as a 
sickness that the homophile movement will . . . fight its most crucial and repeated 
battles.”156 At a gathering with religious leaders, Kameny reiterated that 
homosexuality “per se is neither a sickness, disturbance, or other pathology, but is 
rather . . . [an] orientation . . . fully on par with, and not different in kind from, 
heterosexuality.”157  
Over the course of the 1960s, MSW, DOB, and their allies worked to rebrand 
their cause as a fight to to outlaw sexual orientation discrimination and informed 
the media that the homosexual movement was open to members of any sexual 
orientation.158 In 1964, DOB attacked public health authorities in New York for 
continuing to label homosexuality as a disease.159 Leaders of the group contended,  
how . . . we conduct our sex life is an important moral problem for all of us, 
whether we are heterosexual or homosexual.”160 In 1962, with expanding interest in 
gay rights, DOB, MSW, and other organizations formed the East Coast 
Homophile Organization (ECHO), a loose umbrella group that would coordinate 
the work of homophile groups.161 The message that emerged from ECHO 
conferences centered on orientation.162 In 1968, when a variety of homophile 
groups adopted a bill of rights for gays and lesbians, Rev. Robert Warren Cromey 
explained, “To subject [homosexuals] to legal harassment and exclude them from 
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employment solely because of their sexual orientation is a violation of their 
constitutional rights.”163 
Arguments involving sexual orientation offered several important strategic 
advantages. First, as Kameny tried to compare his movement to the quest for civil 
rights, the rhetoric of sexual orientation bolstered MSW’s reasoning from race. As 
MSW defined it, sexual orientation, like race, was immutable but largely unrelated 
to individual character, personality, or adjustment.164 Moreover, in the same way 
that all Americans had a race, MSW argued that every American had a sexual 
orientation, none superior to or more natural than any other.165 Reasoning from 
race allowed MSW to combat key justifications for anti-gay discrimination. If 
homosexuality could be cured, gays and lesbians could logically respond to 
discrimination by changing their behavior. And if homosexuality was pathological, 
then gays and lesbians were not similarly situated to their heterosexual counterparts 
and could not logically demand equal treatment. 
Just as important, the idea of sexual orientation allowed MSW to argue that the 
case against sexual orientation discrimination was even stronger than the one 
against racial bias. Whereas race was visible, MSW leaders argued in the context of 
federal employment that sexual orientation was private, unrelated to workplace 
conduct, and therefore made no difference to the co-workers or employers of gays 
and lesbians.166 MSW leaders testified before the United States Civil Service 
Commission that “[p]rivate, consensual sexual acts . . . [between] adults . . . [a]re 
not, under any circumstances, the proper concern of an employer, public or 
private.”167 Not only was sexual orientation immutable and unrelated to character; 
Mattachine leaders also framed sexual orientation as a harmless difference to which 
no reasonable employer could logically object. 
By the late 1960s, homophile attorneys and their allies in organizations like the 
ACLU used the idea of sexual orientation to challenge discriminatory immigration 
and employment laws.168 Litigation had unintended consequences, however, as the 
courts used a different idea of sexual orientation to uphold discriminatory practices 
and policies.  
In the immigration context, movement members initially stayed away from the 
idea of an immutable sexual orientation. Even so, the Supreme Court used the idea 
of sexual orientation to forge what Kenji Yoshino has called a “one drop rule”—a 
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conclusion that any same-sex sexual act signals homosexuality.169 Borrowing from 
the idea that homosexuality was a matter of inborn, immutable preference, the 
courts expanded federal authority to deport anyone proven to have had homosexual 
sex.170  
Later, after the movement popularized the idea of homosexuality as an 
immutable sexual orientation, courts used the distinction between conduct and 
status to limit antidiscrimination protections. By distinguishing orientation from 
conduct and identity, certain judges and administrative officials sustained 
discrimination against employees who “flaunted” their status.171 Immutability 
became a limiting principle for demands for protection against discrimination.172 
By the 1970s, when activists first challenged bans on same-sex marriage, the 
courts turned immutability arguments against the movement in a different way. 
Movement members analogized sexual orientation to race and sex, arguing that all 
three were immutable.173 Drawing on this logic, courts sometimes concluded that 
same-sex couples were not similarly situated to heterosexual couples with respect to 
either marriage or reproduction.174 The idea of real, biological differences that the 
Supreme Court used to sever the connection between sex equality and reproduction 
stood at the heart of decisions limiting access to marriage. 
 
E.  In Boutilier, Activists Separate Status and Conduct 
 
In the context of immigration, movement members temporarily moved away 
from framing sexual orientation as an immutable orientation in  
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a case that found its way to 
the Supreme Court.175 Clive Michael Boutilier, a Canadian immigrant, had moved 
to the United States to pursue better employment opportunities.176 In 1963, he 
applied for citizenship, and during his interview, he admitted that he had been 
arrested on a sodomy charge.177 After further questioning, Boutilier acknowledged 
that he had previously engaged in both homosexual and heterosexual acts.178 
Indeed, at the time he sought naturalization, Boutilier was in a long-term, 
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committed relationship with another man.179 On the basis of these admissions, 
immigration officials submitted Boutilier’s case to the Public Health Service, which 
certified that Boutilier was “afflicted with . . . a psychopathic personality” under the 
McCarren-Walter Act and therefore subject to deportation.180 
When Boutilier appealed, his case won the support of the ACLU and a 
homophile group, the Homosexual Law Reform Society, a group headed by Clark 
Polak, a veteran activist and the head of the Janus Society,181 a prominent 
homophile organization.182 As Marc Stein has written, both organizations made 
the decision not to describe Boutilier as openly gay, instead emphasizing that he 
had been sexually involved with both men and women.183 To be sure, as Stein 
argues, this tactical conservatism contributed to Boutilier’s struggles in court, 
especially when the justices noted that Boutilier himself had at times described his 
orientation as a status.184 However, in Boutilier, the idea of an immutable sexual 
orientation, so successfully championed by homophile activists, served as a core 
reason for his deportation.  
Boutilier raised a number of procedural arguments.185 Primarily, though, 
Boutilier argued that the McCarren-Walter Act did not apply to homosexuals or 
give adequate notice that his conduct would subject him to deportation.186 This 
argument failed in the Second Circuit, but the Supreme Court soon granted 
certiorari to resolve a circuit split.187 In the Ninth Circuit, in Fleuti v. Rosenburg, 
the court had accepted the “void for vagueness” argument and reaffirmed that 
argument in 1966.188  
At the Supreme Court, both Boutilier’s counsel and the Homosexual Law 
Reform Association transformed the definition of homosexuality developed by 
homophile organizations. While Boutilier’s counsel echoed arguments that 
homosexuality was not a mental illness,189 because Boutilier could plausibly claim to 
have a more fluid sexual identity, his attorney described homosexuality, at least in 
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his case, as a matter of conduct, not orientation.190 “By and large,” Boutilier 
explained, “homosexuality is a kind of behavior, evidently very wide-spread, and 
not the manifestation of a particular kind of person.”191  
Recognizing that the category of psychopathic personality under the 
McCarren-Walter Act most clearly covered a condition, Boutilier disconnected 
sexual orientation and sexual conduct.192 In the political arena, groups like MSW 
played up the connection between behavior and status, describing sexual 
orientation as an immutable, naturally occurring trait.193 At least for those like 
Boutilier, his attorney insisted that sexual relationships were voluntarily chosen and 
distinguishable from any more lasting identity.194 “[T]here is nothing in the record 
to establish or even suggest that those experiences were compulsive in character and 
not merely a matter of choice,” Boutilier argued.195 The distinction between freely 
chosen conduct and immutable identity meant both that Boutilier did not count as 
a psychopathic personality under the statute and did not have notice that 
immigration authorities would regard him as such.196 
Polak’s Homosexual Law Reform Society of America similarly refined the idea 
of sexual orientation on which MSW had frequently relied. The organization’s 
brief reasoned, “That homosexuality and heterosexuality represent anything other 
than ‘differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure’ has not been 
established.”197 The brief canvassed psychological evidence indicating that 
homosexuality was not a mental illness, but stopped short of offering the definition 
of sexual orientation promoted by MSW.198 
Quoting psychiatrists who testified on behalf of the Petitioner, attorneys for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) responded that homosexuality was 
an immutable orientation.199 Pointing to the legislative history of the McCarren-
Walter Act, the INS argued that Congress had always intended to treat 
homosexuals as being afflicted with a psychopathic personality.200 When discussing 
whether the statute excluded Boutilier, the INS used the idea of orientation in 
Boutilier’s case to suggest that virtually any homosexual conduct was irrefutable 
evidence of status: 
 
This evidence, coupled with the Public Health Service's certificate based 
upon it, compelled a finding that petitioner was homosexual when he 
entered. It is true that petitioner, by his own account, had had occasional 
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heterosexual experiences prior to his entry. But they were far fewer than 
his homosexual experiences, and hardly detract from his clearly—and 
concededly—dominant homosexual orientation.201 
 
Superficially, the INS’s argument read as an assertion that homosexuality was a 
mathematical question, and Boutilier had too many same-sex relationships to 
qualify as a heterosexual.202 Read more carefully, however, the INS’s argument 
leveraged the idea of an immutable orientation that homophile groups had 
crafted.203 In this analysis, it no longer mattered whether or not psychiatrists treated 
homosexuality as a mental illness.204 Whatever homosexuality was, it was 
unchangeable, and sexual behavior signaled a more fixed identity or condition.205 It 
was this status, the INS argued, that Congress had targeted in the McCarren-
Walter Act.206  
The INS also turned the testimony of Boutilier’s expert witnesses on its head.207 
Boutilier had presented the opinions of two psychiatric experts, both of whom 
emphasized Boutilier’s experimentation with heterosexual sex and his “fluid” sexual 
identity.208 The witnesses also asserted that homosexuality was not a mental 
illness.209 Even accepting this proposition as true, the INS argued that Boutilier’s 
immutable status made him excludable.210 The INS brief emphasized that 
Boutilier’s expert had “referred to his ‘homosexual orientation.’”211  
This admission, for the INS, was tantamount to acknowledging that Boutilier 
was targeted because of who and what he was, not because he had made particular 
choices.212 At most, by referring to orientation, Boutilier’s expert could “show that 
petitioner, while homosexual, was not dangerous or psychopathic.”213 Because 
Boutilier knew he was homosexual, the INS argued that he was clearly excludable 
under the act and had ample notice of the possibility that he would be deported.214 
The Court’s opinion in Boutilier similarly applied the lens of an immutable 
orientation to Boutilier’s case. Writing for a majority of six, Justice Clark first 
emphasized that Boutilier admitted to acts that necessarily confirmed his status as a 
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homosexual.215 The basis for his deportation, in the majority’s view, lay not with 
Boutilier’s post-entry sexual conduct but in the status he had claimed for himself.216  
The Court rejected Boutilier’s void-for-vagueness claim on similar grounds.217 
Boutilier had argued that he had no notice that post-entry conduct, such as the 
sexual contact and an ongoing relationship to which he had admitted, could give 
rise to a deportation order.218 The Supreme Court responded that Boutilier was 
being deported because of his condition, not his conduct:219 “The petitioner is not 
being deported for conduct engaged in after his entry into the United States, but 
rather for characteristics he possessed at the time of his entry,” Clark wrote.220 
“Here, when petitioner first presented himself at our border for entrance, he was 
already afflicted with homosexuality.”221 
Boutilier did not squarely address whether a majority of psychiatrists would 
view homosexuality as a mental illness.222 Indeed, the Court treated the category of 
“psychopathic personality” as a legal question, rather than a scientific one.223 
Nevertheless, the Court assumed that homosexuality was a condition, an 
unchangeable characteristic.224 Even if there was no psychiatric consensus about 
homosexuality, the Boutilier Court reasoned that sexual orientation was an 
immutable trait that Congress could legitimately make grounds for deportation.225  
 
F.  Courts Treat the Distinction Between Status and Conduct as a Rational Basis 
for Discrimination 
 
In the context of employment discrimination, in the 1960s and 1970s, workers 
seeking a job in the federal civil service or in public school teaching began 
questioning the legitimacy of sexual-orientation discrimination. Bureaucrats and 
courts skeptical of these claims argued that while employers could not target 
anyone on the basis of an immutable status, the “flaunting” of orientation was fair 
game.  
The conduct-status distinction first frustrated the movement in its effort to 
eliminate discrimination in the civil service. John Macy, the head of the United 
States Civil Service Commission in the 1960s, was a committed liberal who had 
                                                                                                             
215 Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967).  
216 See id. at 124. 
217 See id. at 123–25. 
218 See id. at 124. 
219 See id. at 123–25. 
220 Id. at 123 (emphasis in original).  
221 Id. 
222 See generally id. at 123–25 (“[T]he test here is what the Congress intended, not what differing 
psychiatrists may think.”).  
223 See id. (noting that Congress “was not laying down a clinical test, but an exclusionary standard . . 
. .”).  
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
2017–2018                                 What is Sexual Orientation? 
 
89
spoken favorably of antidiscrimination mandates.226 When Frank Kameny 
requested a meeting with Macy, however, Macy turned him down flat.227 Macy 
continued refusing similar requests until 1965, when Kameny and a group of 
twenty-five activists picketed the United States Civil Service Commission.228 
Following the picket, Kameny and a small group of colleagues received a meeting 
with some of Macy’s colleagues and were later instructed to submit a written 
statement of their views.229 In the written statement, Kameny and Mattachine 
elaborated on the claim that sexual orientation was an immutable trait that 
subjected gays and lesbians to unjustifiable discrimination.230 The Mattachine 
statement asserted that gays and lesbians possessed every relevant trait of a 
sociological minority.231 In addition to sharing a common trait and facing 
discrimination, gays and lesbians were rarely judged on individual merit. “Minority 
group members are judged not as individuals,” the statement explained, “but as 
members of a group, every member bearing the consequences and stigma of the 
faults, the weaknesses, and the sins of particular individuals.”232 The statement also 
reiterated that homosexuality was neither changeable nor pathological.233 As the 
statement reasoned, “[w]e do not grant, conceptually, that rehabilitation applies to 
homosexuality and its practice.”234 
Macy’s response borrowed from the idea of sexual orientation to limit any 
demand for protection against discrimination.235 In rejecting Mattachine’s position, 
Macy agreed that discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation would be 
wrong.236 Rather than targeting anyone on the basis of status, Macy argued that the 
Civil Service Commission acted upon the basis of “overt conduct . . . not upon 
spurious classification of individuals.”237 By acting on the basis of conduct alone, 
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Macy claimed a right to terminate anyone who admitted to being homosexual or 
expressed pride in her identity.238 Macy explained: 
 
To be sure[,] if an individual applicant were to publicly proclaim that he 
engages in homosexual conduct, that he prefers such relationships, that 
he is not sick, or emotionally disturbed, and that he simply has different 
sexual preferences, as some members of the Mattachine Society openly 
avow, the Commission would be required to find such an individual 
unsuitable for Federal employment.239  
 
In early employment discrimination cases, skeptical courts used the distinction 
between conduct and a private status, sexual orientation, to reject demands for 
equal treatment. Consider the case of Joseph Acanfora, a Maryland school 
teacher.240 As a college student at Penn State, he became involved in a homophile 
group that sought official recognition from the university.241 When the university 
refused, the group brought suit, and Acanfora agreed to be one of the named 
plaintiffs.242 While the litigation was pending, Acanfora began pursuing a career in 
education and eventually gained a position teaching in the Maryland schools.243 
When the Acanfora case again reached the courts, Joseph spoke to the media.244 
The school district almost immediately transferred Acanfora to a non-teaching 
position.245 Because of his access to the media, Acanfora criticized the school’s 
stance on television and in print, and the school ultimately dismissed him.246 
In federal district court, Acanfora argued that his firing violated the First 
Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.247 Acanfora contended that he had been a victim of sexual 
orientation discrimination, notwithstanding the fact that his behavior and 
preferences had no bearing on what happened in public.248 In dicta, the district 
court acknowledged that the right to privacy might cover Acanfora’s claim,249 but 
the court focused on the claim that Acanfora’s transfer violated his right to free 
speech under the First Amendment.250 Because Acanfora had taken his case to the 
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public, the court viewed his comments as the kind of non-speech covered by the 
court’s incitement doctrine.251 Acanfora’s gay pride would be “likely to incite or 
produce imminent effects deleterious to the educational process.”252 “There exists 
then not only a right of privacy, so strongly urged by the plaintiff, but also a duty of 
privacy,” the court explained.253  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed sexual orientation in similar terms. 
In Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission, a probationary employee, 
John Singer, started work as a typist at the Seattle office of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).254 At work, Singer identified as a gay man.255 
He served on the board of directors of the Seattle Gay Alliance and as an act of 
protest, had requested a marriage license for himself and his life partner.256 Because 
of Singer’s activism, the EEOC terminated him, citing his “immoral and 
notoriously disgraceful conduct, [in] openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual 
way of life.”257  
In court, Singer argued that his firing violated the First Amendment’s free 
speech and free association guarantees, and because there was no rational 
connection between his sexual orientation and his ability to perform his job, he 
argued that his termination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.258 Because of Singer’s “open and public flaunting [of] his homosexual 
way of life,” the Ninth Circuit rejected his First Amendment and Due Process 
claims.259 From the standpoint of Due Process, the court identified a rational basis 
for the firing.260 Singer was victimized not on the basis of his sexual orientation but 
because his “notorious conduct and open flaunting and careless display of 
unorthodox sexual conduct in public might be relevant to the efficiency of the 
service.”261 Open conduct also doomed Singer’s First Amendment claim. As the 
court reasoned, the Commission could have properly concluded that “the interest of 
the Government as an employer ‘in promoting the efficiency of the public service’ 
outweighed the interest of its employee in exercising his First Amendment Rights 
through publicly flaunting and broadcasting his homosexual activities.”262 
Cases like Acanfora and Singer showed how the idea of sexual orientation could 
be used to justify discrimination against employees who openly challenged anti-gay 
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bias. As a limiting principle, sexual orientation arguments protected employees only 
if they remained “in the closet.” By having a public relationship or participating in 
advocacy, gays and lesbians, by definition, gave employers a sufficient reason for 
discrimination. 
 
G.  Courts Seize on “Real” Differences Between Homosexual and Heterosexual 
Couples 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, courts also seized on the idea of sexual orientation to 
defeat early demands for same-sex marriage. When Singer and his life partner were 
refused a marriage license, Singer brought suit, arguing that the state’s marriage law 
violated both the state and federal constitutions.263 In particular, Singer insisted 
that prohibiting same-sex marriage constituted impermissible gender and sexual-
orientation discrimination.264 First, he contended that “to construe state law to 
permit a man to marry a woman but at the same time to deny him the right to 
marry another man is to construct an unconstitutional classification ‘on account of 
sex.’”265 The court rejected this claim on both state and federal constitutional 
grounds, leveraging the biological differences between gay and straight 
couples.266 “[I]t is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the 
birth of children by their union,” the court reasoned.267 “Thus the refusal of the 
state to authorize same-sex marriage results from such impossibility of reproduction 
rather than from an invidious discrimination ‘on account of sex.’”268  
Singer responded that the law discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, a 
classification that he thought the courts should treat as suspect.269 But, as the court 
reasoned, there was no sexual orientation discrimination because gay and lesbian 
couples were not similarly situated to their heterosexual counterparts: 
 
[I]t is apparent that the state’s refusal to grant a license allowing the 
appellants to marry one another is not based upon appellants’ status as 
males, but rather it is based upon the state’s recognition that our society 
as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for 
procreation and the rearing of children. This is true even though married 
couples are not required to become parents and even though some 
couples are incapable of becoming parents and even though not all 
couples who produce children are married. These, however, are 
exceptional situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a 
protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated 
with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no 
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same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their 
union.270 
 
Defending an unchangeable, immutable status opened the door to justifications 
based on the supposed reproductive and biological differences between gay and 
straight couples. Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on sex 
discrimination, courts rejected equal protection claims on the basis that gay couples 
could not reproduce in vivo and thereby failed to serve the primary aim of marriage. 
Even from the standpoint of due process, the court identified reproductive 
differences as a rational basis for excluding gays from marriage. 
The same idea of real differences informed the reasoning of Baker v. Nelson, 
the first case involving same-sex marriage to make it to the Supreme Court.271 
When Baker and his life partner were refused a marriage license, Baker argued that 
the state marriage law authorized same-sex marriage and violated the Constitution 
if interpreted in any other way.272 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected both 
Baker’s due process and equal protection arguments, highlighting a real, biological 
difference between gay and straight couples.273 “The institution of marriage [is] a 
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of 
children within a family,” the Baker Court explained.274 Even recognizing that 
some heterosexual couples did not wish to procreate, the court repeated that 
marriage and procreation were inextricably linked and did not logically apply to 
same-sex couples.275  
Over the course of the 1970s, cases like Acanfora, Singer, and Baker convinced 
many in the emerging gay liberation movement that strategies based on sexual 
orientation were too risky. Given that certain definitions of sexual orientation had 
been effectively used to limit the government’s duty to avoid discrimination, 
activists began experimenting with an alternative definition based on sexual or 
affectional preference.276 
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II.  SEXUAL PREFERENCE AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the gay rights movement changed 
dramatically. In 1969, in New York City, customers at the Stonewall Inn frustrated 
by police harassment and shakedowns fought back.277 The riots came at a time 
when identity politics and radical social movements often made the front page.278 
Following the Stonewall riots, gay-rights activists formed a more radical movement 
of their own.279 Founded in New York City, the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) 
described its cause as the sexual liberation of all Americans, gay and straight.280 
GLF members also tried to win a place in the broader New Left, and the 
organization partnered with black power and feminist groups impatient with the 
pace of social change.281 By 1969, former GLF members started the Gay Activists 
Alliance (GAA) as a splinter group that would prioritize antidiscrimination 
protections for gays and lesbians over a broad New Left agenda.282  
GAA focused on a civil-rights ordinance that would outlaw discrimination 
against gays and lesbians.283 Members of the GAA rejected the sometimes cautious 
approach taken by other gay-rights organizations, handing out pamphlets urging 
voters to “vote gay” and holding confrontational “zaps” at public events and the 
workplaces of politicians.284 As Jim Owles of GAA explained, “We do not ask for 
respectability or sympathy from straight people.”285 GAA leaders framed the bill as 
part of an effort to bring gays and lesbians out of the closet. As GAA leader Bruce 
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Voeller stated, “It should be obvious that our general purpose in getting bills passed 
is to educate gays and the general public.”286  
While rejecting the strategy adopted by organizations like MSW, GAA initially 
used the language of sexual orientation in the bill it promoted.287 Reports stated 
that, “The bill is technically an amendment to the city’s Omnibus Human Rights 
Act, seeking to insert the words ‘sexual orientation’ among a list of actions on 
which discrimination is illegal.”288 
The bill’s early struggles highlighted some of the problems with a  
sexual-orientation framing encountered by homophile activists in the 1960s. In 
January 1972, the bill died in committee.289 GAA leaders blamed the defeat on 
New York Mayor, Richard Lindsey, who activists believed had done too little to 
support the provision.290 Opposing politicians attributed the bill’s downfall to its 
sponsors’ focus on gay pride.291 While ambivalent politicians might support a bill 
outlawing discrimination based on purely private sexual orientation, one opponent 
of the bill explained that undecided council members “found [activists’ public] 
behavior generally repugnant.”292 In February, Lindsey issued a directive banning 
discrimination in the city’s department of personnel and civil service commission 
on the basis of “private sexual orientation.”293 Lindsey’s move appeared to be a 
direct response to the complaints raised by the city council.294 The concept of sexual 
orientation seemed to be a limiting principle on the drive for protection against 
discrimination, doing nothing to check bias supposedly based on conduct rather 
than status. 
The use of sexual orientation as a limiting principle continued in 1973. Two 
committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York endorsed Intro 
475 because it focused on private propensity.295 “Much of the resistance to 
legislation . . . stems from the belief that all homosexuals behave in a stereotype 
fashion[,] which is often identified with eccentric dress and conduct,” the 
committees’ report explained.296 “[L]egislation prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation would not require an employer to hire or a landlord to rent to an 
individual who was unacceptable for reasons other than sexual orientation.”297 In 
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December 1973, the same problem cropped up.298 When Intro 475 died again in 
committee, its defeat was linked to an amendment that would have exempted 
“public transvestites” from the bill.299 When council members rejected the 
amendment, its supporters successfully moved for the entire bill to be set aside.300  
Indeed, in 1974, when the bill finally made it out of committee, debate turned 
on whether it would legitimize public gay conduct. Opponents of the bill, including 
the Roman Catholic Church and police and firemen’s unions, contended that it 
would give “public license to uninhibited manifestations of sexual preference or 
sexual relationships” and would “propagandize deviant forms of sexuality.”301 
Council members in favor of the bill successfully added an amendment stating that 
“nothing in the definition of sexual orientation . . . ‘shall be construed to bear upon 
the standards of attire or dress code.’”302 Even the New York Times endorsed the 
bill because of its narrow protections, demanding only “rights [for] a minority who 
in their private lives adopt a ‘sexual orientation’ different from the majority.”303 
When the bill went down in defeat, the shortcomings of the use of the term sexual 
orientation—at least as council members had framed it—seemed clear.304  
 
A.  Sexual Preference Emerges as an Alternative Framework 
 
As early as 1973, activists began exploring alternative definitions to sexual 
orientation, and one particularly influential effort unfolded in Minneapolis-St. 
Paul.305 Twenty activists met with sympathetic mental health professionals and 
attorneys to develop a model civil rights ordinance.306 “Some of those present felt 
that words like ‘homosexual’ or ‘sexual orientation’ ought to be used” because 
“‘everybody [knew] what they mean[t].’”307 Others worried that an orientation-
based approach would inevitably leave many without protection, particularly when 
it came to conduct.308 As one attendee explained, “Gay people get hassled not for 
what they do in bed, but for publicly expressing their affection—holding hands, 
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dancing[,] or even for projecting an image which society does not usually associate 
with ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ roles.”309 
Ultimately, the attendees settled on a definition first proposed by clinical 
psychologist, Gary Schoener, who favored the language of “affectional or sexual 
preference.”310 As Schoener saw it, activists should describe bisexuality and 
homosexuality as neutral or even positive choices rather than as inborn traits that 
victimized those who were not innately heterosexual.311 Schoener worried that 
sexual orientation as a category inaccurately suggested “that [one could] be put into 
one box based on [one’s] behavior.”312 Attendees also approved of the language 
“affectional or sexual preference” because it dignified the relationships of GLBTQ 
couples and highlighted the non-sexual dimensions of those relationships.313  
 After prevailing in the Twin Cities, GLBTQ activists successfully pushed for 
city-level referenda in over nine other cities.314 Some cities, like Detroit, developed 
laws focused on sexual orientation.315 Other cities used sexual preference as an 
alternative framework.316  
Ultimately, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF, then the 
National Gay Task Force), the group working to coordinate the campaign for civil-
rights ordinances at the national level, adopted a strategy based on sexual or 
affectional preference.317 NGLTF hoped that the push for local antidiscrimination 
ordinances would set the stage for a federal civil rights bill.318 Believing that 
sexuality was fixed at birth and could not be changed, most of the organization’s 
male leaders favored the rhetoric of orientation.319 Women in NGLTF, however, 
argued that preference language was both broader and more affirming, legitimizing 
the very conduct that New York legislators had found unacceptable.320 Ultimately, 
leaders of the group decided that preference language better served the movement’s 
goals for several reasons.321 
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First, the language of preference seemed to make a cleaner break with 
arguments about dysfunction and mental illness still circulating in the psychiatric 
community. Avoiding stigma mattered particularly to lesbian feminists, many of 
whom had long used to the language of sexual preference to fend off attacks by 
some other members of the women’s liberation movement.322 
Moreover, movement leaders believed that preference language promised 
broader protection than did the rhetoric of orientation. As the New York 
experience indicated, some lawmakers facing orientation bans still claimed the 
authority to discriminate on the basis of conduct.323 In other cities, the conduct-
orientation distinction posed a similar risk. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, when 
prosecutors pursued a lesbian couple observed dancing at a night club, local 
prosecutors denied that they discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.324 
Assistant District Attorney Edward Pear explained, “It was our feeling that it was 
their conduct that was unacceptable.”325  
Sometimes, movement leaders also hoped that sexual preference laws would 
protect those targeted because of gender non-conformity.326 When Boulder, 
Colorado, considered a civil-rights ordinance, a sociologist testifying in favor of the 
measure implied that the reform would help anyone targeted on the basis of 
orientation-based stereotyping.327 
NGLTF leaders promoted city ordinances as a way of building support for an 
amendment to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 that would protect gays and 
lesbians.328 In 1974, Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY) introduced a bill 
amending Title VII to protect against discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual 
orientation, or marital status.329 Because of the threat of conduct-based 
discrimination, Minnesota activists urged Abzug to change the bill to cover “sexual 
or affectional preference” rather than an immutable orientation.330 “Please amend 
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your bill to recognize that physical intimacy is only one[,] albeit important[,] part 
of human affections,” argued Michael McConnell, another Minnesota advocate.331 
“Holding hands and other public expressions of [a]ffection cost more jobs than 
private sexual [behavior].”332 
NGLTF, leader Bruce Voeller travelled to Washington, DC, to ask Abzug to 
change the bill’s language.333 Voeller “very strong[ly]” urged Abzug to frame 
sexuality as a matter of “affectional [or sexual] preference” instead of an immutable 
orientation.334 In explaining his reasoning, he emphasized that sexual orientation 
laws left some without protection.335 He cited a case from Minneapolis-St. Paul in 
which police officers had harassed a couple for holding hands.336 Since these men 
were targeted because of their conduct, Voeller argued that “under the pharse [sic] 
‘sexual orientation’ it would not be clear that they would be protected from 
harassment.”337  
Although Abzug’s proposal never made it out of committee, in 1977, when 
Representative Ed Koch (D-NY) again introduced a gay-rights amendment to 
Title VII, activists in the NGLTF and an allied organization, the Gay Rights 
National Lobby (GRNL), continued depending on the language of “affectional or 
sexual preference.”338 
 
B.  The Movement Turns Again to a Sexual-Orientation Frame 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, movement leaders concluded that the costs of 
a sexual-preference frame were simply too high. At a time when public tolerance of 
homosexuality was limited, the recently mobilized Religious Right happily 
described homosexuality as a bad choice, rather than an immutable trait.339 After 
the start of the AIDS epidemic, when  
anti-gay activists denounced what they described as inappropriate behavior choices, 
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GLBTQ activists had yet another reason for relying on the language of sexual 
orientation.340 
The downsides of a sexual preference frame first came into view in June 1977, 
when Miami voters decided to repeal an antidiscrimination ordinance by a 2-1 
margin.341 Anita Bryant, a former beauty queen and religious conservative, claimed 
victory in Miami as the result of a strategy centered on the idea that sexuality was 
freely chosen.342 If homosexuality was a mere preference, Bryant asserted that the 
risk of gays and lesbians “converting” children was all too real.343 As Bryant told the 
New York Times in March 1977, “What these people really want . . . is the legal 
right to propose to our children that there is an acceptable alternate way of life—
that being a homosexual or lesbian is not really wrong.”344 NGLTF members 
worried that Bryant had exposed the weaknesses of the organization’s existing 
strategy.345 Voeller suggested that NGTF “pull away from ‘right to choose’ 
[arguments] in the short term.”346 The Anita Bryant controversy had exposed some 
of the risks posed by a preference-based definition. If Bryant stoked fears about the 
spread of homosexuality, choice arguments could only exacerbate the problem.347 
“‘Right of Choice’ is not a rallying point,” one board member reasoned. “People 
[think they] have a right to try to prevent children from being homosexual.”348  
As an emerging Religious Right and New Right coalition attacked other civil 
rights ordinances, concern about a preference frame intensified. In St. Paul, 
Minnesota, Reverend Richard Angwin, a fundamentalist preacher from Kansas, 
headed the repeal campaign.349 Angwin used the idea of sexual preference to argue 
for repeal.350 “[B]eing a pervert is like being a thief,” Angwin explained,351 “[B]oth 
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are wrong and both can continue or repent.”352 Angwin’s supporters carried the day. 
St. Paul voted to repeal its ordinance by a vote of 54,096 to 31, 694.353 
Religious Right groups mounted signature petition drives in Wichita, Kansas, 
and Eugene, Oregon.354 In both cities, local pastors argued that homosexuality was 
an illegitimate preference.355 Reverend Ron Adrian, the head of Concerned 
Citizens for Community Standards in Wichita, rejected the idea that the ordinance 
had anything to do with civil rights.356 “We think it’s an effort on the part of a 
small group of people to ask us to approve of their immoral lifestyle,” Adrian 
asserted.357 Rosalie Butler, a sympathizer of the Religious Right and a member of 
the St. Paul City Council, backed Adrian’s assessment.358 “Those who choose a 
perverted lifestyle, whether it be as a homosexual, robber or drug pusher, can’t 
expect the full rights . . . that people who live in step with society get,” she 
explained.359 
Arguments about immoral preferences apparently spoke to voters in Wichita 
and Eugene. On May 10, Reverend Adrian celebrated a huge margin of victory in 
Wichita, with voters repealing the city’s ordinance by a margin of 47,246 to 
10,005.360 Barely more than two weeks later, a partial tally in Eugene showed that 
13,838 voters preferred repeal, with only 7,685 in opposition.361  
In the wake of these defeats, NGLTF downplayed a preference frame so much 
that Lesbian Tide, a movement publication, accused NGLTF of “call[ing] for an 
end to choice.”362 Instead of refuting this charge, NGLTF leaders sent a letter 
“clarifying its position . . . reiterat[ing that] ‘sexual preference’ and ‘orientation’ [are 
both] useful terms to different segments of the community.”363 
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The AIDS epidemic offered another powerful reason to move away from the 
language of sexual preference. After 1981, when the New York Times first reported 
on the spread of AIDS,364 the number of patients increased rapidly, nearly tripling 
between 1982 and 1983 alone.365 
The federal government responded slowly, forcing local GLBTQ groups to 
pick up the slack.366 Even when Congress appropriated money for AIDS research 
for the first time in 1983, President Reagan threatened to veto a bill that would 
have dedicated only $12 million for addressing the epidemic.367  
Beyond governmental neglect, examples of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians proliferated. Conservative writer William Buckley proposed that people 
with AIDS be tattooed so that others could easily avoid them.368 In 1985, 
Congressman William Dannemeyer (R-CA) proposed a series of bills that would 
make it a felony for any person with AIDS to give blood, deny federal funds to 
cities that did not close down gay bathhouses, and prohibit persons with AIDS 
from either working in the health care industry or attending public schools.369 Even 
cosmopolitan cities like New York and San Francisco shuttered bath houses rather 
than focusing on education about safe sex.370  
Religious right activists used the idea of sexual preference to justify  
anti-gay bias. In testifying before Congress, Reverend Charles McIlhenny, a 
California-based anti-gay activist, argued that “homosexuality [was] not caused by 
a constitutional genetic, glandular, or hormonal factor,” but rather “a learned 
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behavior.”371 If gays and lesbians made a voluntary choice, McIlhenny argued that 
they could not be true victims of discrimination: “Granting special legislation to 
groups because of behavior—let alone immoral behavior—opens the floodgates to 
almost any group that wants minority status.”372  
At the national level, Religious Right figures echoed this reasoning. In 
opposing an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, Connie Marshner, a leader of the 
New Right and Religious Right, contended that privacy rights militated against 
protections for gays and lesbians.373 “What we are advocating,” she explained, “is 
that our right to privacy be respected: That the homosexual lifestyle not be flaunted 
in our neighborhood and shouted from the housetops.”374 The opposition made 
sexual preference arguments shorthand for the selfishness of which Religious Right 
activists accused gay men.375 
The politics of AIDS reinforced social conservatives’ efforts to equate 
selfishness and sexual preference. Judy Welton of Parents United Because 
Legislators Ignore Children (PUBLIC), a group that campaigned for the expulsion 
of infected children from public schools, argued against increased funding for 
research, public education, or drug trials related to AIDS.376 Framing sexuality as a 
mere preference, Welton argued that gay men and lesbians put their wellbeing 
above everyone else’s.377 “What kind of compassion,” she asked, “allows a disease 
such as AIDS to go on, knowing the causes are selfish, immoral behavior 
patterns?”378  
Dannemeyer, one of the most visible anti-gay leaders, happily discussed the 
idea of sexual preference.379 In response to accusations of bigotry, Dannemeyer 
wrote to the Los Angeles Times, “Whether the public health response to AIDS 
should be compromised because of the perceived sensitivities of the male 
homosexual community, or whether gay rights should be given ‘equal treatment,’ 
comes down to basic value choices in a free society,” Dannemeyer stated. “I speak 
for those who favor traditional family values.”380 
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Leaders of the NGLTF responded that sexual orientation discrimination, not 
sexual preference discrimination, was the real issue. In renewing the push for 
federal civil rights legislation, GRNL created a public education campaign to 
“analyze current barriers in public thinking to the enactment of effective public 
policy measures ending discrimination based on sexual orientation” and “[t]o 
educate the public on the nature of homosexuality.”381 Recognizing the downsides 
of sexual preference arguments, members of the group planned to “counter” 
special-preference claims.382 To do so, GRNL almost exclusively used the language 
of orientation. “Our goal,” the group stated, “[is] equal rights and justice under the 
law regardless of sexual orientation.”383 In testifying in favor of an amendment to 
Title VII, Jean O’Leary, then a member of GRNL, also insisted civil rights 
protections were “not designed to approve a lifestyle or create a special minority—
but simply to prohibit discrimination . . . based on sexual orientation.”384 
NGLTF also cast aside sexual-preference rhetoric. In lobbying inside and 
outside of Congress, the organization convinced the Mayors’ Conference to 
“[r]ecogniz[e] the right of all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation, to full 
participation in American society.”385 AIDS and the discrimination it unleashed 
bolstered arguments about sexual orientation discrimination. As NGLTF argued in 
the period, “90% of lesbians and gay men have been victimized at some point in 
their lives solely because of their sexual orientation.”386 
 
C.  Orientation, Suspect Classification, and the Courts 
 
As GLBTQ activists renewed the push for protection in the Supreme Court, 
activists again gravitated toward the language of sexual orientation. As the 
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movement explored arguments that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, 
it became more important to describe sexual identities and behaviors as 
unchangeable. In the 1986 case, Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court rejected 
an argument that the due process right to privacy extended to consensual adult 
intimacy.387 When Bowers temporarily seemed to foreclose a privacy strategy, 
movement attorneys began experimenting more vigorously with alternatives.388 
While continuing to push privacy arguments in state court, movement lawyers 
began putting more emphasis on claims that sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification, much like race.389  
The language of sexual orientation has become a cornerstone of progressive 
arguments for GLBTQ equality—a way of maximizing support for the cause and 
strengthening equal-protection arguments in the courts. By contrast, those 
skeptical of the GLBTQ movement draw on the language of sexual preference to 
challenge both legal and political demands for equal treatment. This political 
alignment now seems natural, but the politics and law of defining sexuality have 
changed significantly over time. In the 1970s, leading activists stayed away from 
the rhetoric of sexual orientation. Groups at the state and federal level argued that 
orientation-based definitions offered too little protection. Only after the AIDS 
epidemic and the rise of the Religious Right did arguments about sexual preference 
come to seem a staple of social conservatism advocacy. As this history shows, sexual 
orientation as a legal category has had multiple, conflicting meanings, some of 
which have been used to limit demands for equal treatment. Part III turns to the 
definition of sexual orientation adopted in Obergefell before exploring its potential 
shortcomings. 
 
III.  IMMUTABILITY, EQUALITY, AND THE LEGACY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
 
The meaning of sexual orientation—or even the proper understanding of 
homosexuality—is not fully addressed in either the majority or dissenting opinions 
in Obergefell. Nevertheless, the majority opinion adopts an understanding of sexual 
orientation reminiscent of the definitions long advanced by GLBTQ groups.  
Obergefell first mentions sexual orientation in support of the majority’s “history 
of marriage” as a story “of both continuity and change.”390 After describing an 
emerging tolerance for gay and lesbian relationships, the Court explains, “Only in 
more recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is 
both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”391 In support of this 
definition, Obergefell cited an amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the 
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American Psychological Association (APA) and other mental health 
organizations.392 Significantly, however, the Court’s definition of sexual orientation 
differed substantially from the account given by the APA. In its brief, the APA 
described sexual orientation as “normal,” “generally not chosen,” and “highly 
resistant to change.”393 The Obergefell Court deliberately frames sexual orientation 
as unchangeable and never chosen, core dimensions of a definition missing from 
the APA’s own analysis.394  
On paper, at least, GLBTQ attorneys won—and not just on the issue of 
marriage access. By describing sexual orientation as immutable, the Court seems 
more likely to recognize sexual orientation as a suspect classification. Rhetorically, 
the Court appears to have framed the issue in a way long urged by same-sex 
couples. Observers could be forgiven for believing that Obergefell represents only 
the first step in the recognition of equal treatment for gays, lesbians, and other 
non-conforming individuals. 
However, when put in the context of the history of sexual orientation as a legal 
category, Obergefell’s definition of sexual orientation offers as much reason for 
caution as for celebration. As movement leaders realized over the course of several 
decades, sexual orientation as a concept had not one meaning but many, and those 
defending anti-gay laws successfully enlisted sexual-orientation reasoning in 
defending the status quo. Drawing on the history of sexual orientation arguments, 
this Part next considers several of the risks associated with Obergefell’s definition 
of sexual orientation.  
 
A.  Immutability, Conduct, and Status 
 
Much has changed since the 1970s, as the Obergefell opinion itself recognized. 
Nevertheless, immutability-based definitions carry some of the same risks 
recognized by activists in the 1960s and beyond. In the context of public 
accommodations and same-sex marriage, business owners have claimed to be 
discriminating on the basis of conduct rather than an immutable status.395 These 
claims have failed so far because the courts reject a distinction based on sexual 
orientation “when the conduct [at issue] is so closely correlated with the status that 
it is engaged in exclusively or predominantly by persons who have that particular 
status.”396  
For example, in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., a same-sex couple visited 
a Colorado baker and requested a cake for their upcoming wedding.397 When the 
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proprietor refused, the couple brought suit under a state public accommodations 
law outlawing sexual orientation discrimination.398 The baker responded that the 
business acted not “because of” the couple’s sexual orientation but rather “‘because 
of’ [the couple’s] intended conduct—entering into marriage with a same-sex 
partner—and the celebratory message about same-sex marriage that baking a 
wedding cake would convey.”399  
The court concluded that the couple’s conduct and status were too closely 
intertwined to be distinguishable.400 Similarly, in Elane Photography v. Willock, a 
suit challenging the application of a state civil-rights statute to a photographer who 
refused service to a same-sex couple, the court similarly concluded that the act of 
marriage was “inextricably tied” to sexual orientation itself.401 
Precedent offers some guidance as to when conduct and status cannot be 
separated. In Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, 
Hastings v. Martinez, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an “all 
comers” policy, recognizing only those student groups that opened leadership and 
membership to any student.402 The Christian Legal Society (CLS) argued that 
Hastings’ policy violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of free association and 
free speech.403 The case was governed by the Supreme Court’s limited public forum 
doctrine.404 Under the First Amendment, the Court has held that if a governmental 
entity opens property under its control, any speech restriction has to be viewpoint 
neutral and reasonable.405  
In evaluating the reasonableness of Hastings’ policy, the Court considered the 
relationship between Hastings’ non-discrimination rules and the all-comers 
policy.406 CLS argued that it sought to exclude students not because of their sexual 
orientation but because GLBTQ students did not morally object to gay and lesbian 
sex.407 The Court rejected this distinction.408 Objecting to gay and lesbian sex—a 
behavior identified exclusively with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals—was the same 
thing as objecting to sexual orientation.409  
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The conduct-status distinction worked much more effectively in  
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Clinic.410 In that case, the respondents sought to 
enjoin protests by Operation Rescue, a group organizing anti-blockades, under 
Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.411 To establish a conspiracy under this 
statute, the respondents had to argue that the blockaders shared a discriminatory 
animus against a protected class.412 By opposing abortion, a procedure performed 
only upon women, Operation Rescue supposedly discriminated against women 
because of their status.413 The Bray Court refused to equate the conduct of 
opposing abortion and animus toward women as a group.414 “Whatever one thinks 
of abortion,” the Court explained, “it cannot be denied that there are common and 
respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward 
(or indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class—as is evident from the 
fact that men and women are on both sides of the issue, just as men and women are 
on both sides of petitioners’ unlawful demonstrations.”415 
The Court also rejected the conduct-status argument in the context of sex and 
abortion. Because only women could get pregnant and have abortions, Alexandria 
Women’s Clinic argued that opposition to women’s conduct in choosing abortion 
could not be separated from their status as women.416 The majority was 
unconvinced, reasoning that the clinic could not show a discriminatory purpose 
unless a party “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”417 Because the Court saw opposition to abortion as legitimate, it seemed 
unreasonable to equate sex discrimination and antiabortion activism. As the Court 
explained, “Whether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of preventing abortion, 
that goal in itself . . . does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and for 
such derogatory association with racism.”418 
In spite of the failed use of the conduct-status distinction in a handful of cases, 
the history of sexual orientation as a legal category, together with the Court’s case 
law on the subject, should give us pause. There is no obvious way to determine 
when conduct is so closely related to status that someone can discriminate on the 
basis of either one. The Supreme Court has been less willing to equate conduct and 
status when discriminators invoke what the courts describe as a legitimate moral or 
religious objection to a particular act, like abortion. In seeking to respect and 
dignify  
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conscience-based objections to abortion, the Bray Court readily distinguished 
objections to conduct and status-based discrimination.  
In describing homosexuality as a sexual orientation rather than partly as a 
legitimate choice, the Obergefell Court assumes the validity of moral objections to 
both same-sex marriage and homosexuality. “Many who deem same-sex marriage 
to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or 
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here,” the 
majority explains.419 Indeed, the Obergefell Court goes out of its way to reiterate 
that the “First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and individuals are 
given proper protection.”420 As Bray instructs, the Court may more often 
countenance conduct-based discrimination when the justices assume the legitimacy 
of objections to that conduct.  
Immutability-based definitions of sexual orientation do not effectively address 
these moral objections. Activists using these arguments argued that religious and 
moral opposition to homosexuality was irrelevant more than indefensible. If no one 
could choose a sexual orientation, moral opposition was simply beside the point. 
Rather than describing gay and lesbian relationships as a defensible choice to which 
few could legitimately object, immutability arguments can be easily be squared with 
the belief that business owners and lawmakers have cognizable conscience-based 
objections.  
This approach to sexual orientation is neither necessary nor unavoidable. Prior 
to Obergefell, courts often concluded that same-sex marriage bans had no rational 
basis, reasoning that these laws rested on pure animus toward gays and lesbians.421 
These decisions offered a way to talk about objections to same-sex marriage or 
homosexuality that does not assume the legitimacy of conscience-based objections 
to serving gays and lesbians or refraining from discriminating against them. 
In the future, as courts face new conscience-based challenges, it is worth 
remembering that immutability-based definitions of sexual orientation make it 
much harder to explain why gays and lesbians’ interests in civil rights outweigh 
religious- or expression-based hostility to sexual orientation. Notwithstanding 
language in Obergefell, it is not too late to define sexual orientation in a different 
way. 
 
B.  Sexual Orientation, Biological Differences, and Reasoning from Race and Sex 
 
Bray also serves as a reminder of how immutability arguments have backfired 
for gays and lesbians when the issue of reproduction comes into play. In the context 
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of sex, immutability arguments allowed the Court to justify pregnancy 
discrimination case law based on sex equality and reproduction. The idea of real, 
biological differences between the sexes was at the heart of the distinction drawn by 
the Court. Historically, courts hostile to equality for gays and lesbians have invoked 
reproduction-based, biological distinctions to justify discriminatory treatment. In 
the aftermath of Obergefell, reproductive capacity will not justify bans on same-sex 
marriage. Nevertheless, with Geduldig and Bray still on the books, it remains to be 
seen whether the Court will revive the idea of biological differences in areas more 
closely related to reproduction, particularly access to reproductive technologies.  
Sexual orientation as a legal category has a long and complex history, serving 
the purposes of both opponents and proponents of civil rights for gays and lesbians. 
Nothing in Obergefell or the cases on the conduct-status distinction illuminates 
which of those aims the idea of sexual orientation will serve in the future. In the 
aftermath of the Court’s decision, it will be just as important to promote a proper 
understanding of sexual orientation as it will to be to convince the Court that 
sexual-orientation classifications are suspect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While current scholarship explores possible constitutional approaches to  
sexual-orientation discrimination, the origins of sexual orientation as a legal 
category remain obscure. Other scholars have created a rich and impressive 
dialogue about the history of the law and politics of sexuality, but existing studies 
only touch on how and why sexual orientation emerged as a legal category. This 
Article contributes to the discussion by offering a more complete history, showing 
how even skeptical gay and lesbian activists gravitated toward arguments based on 
biological difference and immutability. This idea of sexual orientation provoked 
controversy, encouraging some movement members to reject related approaches 
altogether. In response to a hostile political climate, movement leaders returned to 
this definition. The Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence also made 
immutability-driven approaches more strategically advantageous.  
Nevertheless, there was and is nothing inevitable about the rise of this 
definition of sexual orientation. Other definitions—based partly on individual  
choice—captured the attention of the movement and even some lawmakers. 
Obergefell hints that a majority on the Court is prepared to accept a definition of 
sexual orientation that has made it harder to defuse conscience-based objections, 
refute conduct-based discrimination, and reject “real differences” arguments based 
on reproductive capacity. As history shows, we can do better. 
